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NOTES
The Double Standard under Section 162:
Why the Employee Business Deduction
is No Longer for Employees
INTRODUCTION
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for
"ordinary and necessary" expenses incurred in carrying on a "trade or
business."' The United States Supreme Court defined the terms "ordinary"
and "necessary" in Welch v. Helvering.2 The Court stated that "ordinary"
implies that the expenses are common to the business in which they occur,3
while "necessary" means "appropriate and helpful."4 However, the Internal
Revenue Service, supported primarily by the Tax Court, has recently
disallowed deductions for many expenditures incurred in the course of
carrying on a trade or business, claiming that the expenditures are not
"ordinary and necessary."5 Examination of these cases reveals a kind of
"employment continuum," in which employees and middle management at
the lower end are denied deductions, while those with "higher" positions,
such as employers and self-employed persons, are often permitted to deduct
essentially the same expenditures under section 162.' Persons who are in
higher management positions, such as the officers of a company, hold a status
somewhere between employees and employers, depending on the facts of the
particular case Although one could question whether the availability of this
I I.R.C. § 162(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
z 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
3 Id. at 114-15.
4 Id. at 113.
Bos I. BrIxss. & MAR-nN I MCMARON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 10.3 (Supp. III 1993) (citing cases in which deductions for business-related
expenditures were disallowed because the expenses were not ordinary and necessary).
'See, e.g., Dunkelberger v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1567, 1567 (1992)
(denying an employee's deduction for expenses incuned in purchasing occasional meals,
parties, doughnuts, and candy and flowers for the employees under her supervision).
7 Id. at 1569.
' See, e.g., Noyce v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 670, 682-85 (1991) (allowing vice-
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particular deduction would make a significant difference, since taxpayers
must itemize to take the deduction,9 the issue here is not one of amount,
but of principle.
The emerging differences regarding the deductibility of business
expenses indicate that courts are using conflicting interpretations of
"ordinary and necessary," with lower-level management and employees
being subjected to a stricter standard than employers and upper-level
management. This Note discusses the development and possible implica-
tions of such a double standard. Part I of this Note examines the
"ordinary and necessary" language of section 162 by analyzing the
Supreme Court's definition in Welch v. Helvering," as well as enhance-
ments of that definition offered by later courts and the regulations to the
Internal Revenue Code." Part II discusses the cases exemplifying the
courts' tendency to apply different standards for taxpayers' business
deductions depending on the status of the individual taxpayer. 2 Part III
analyzes this recent trend in light of the definitions established by the
Supreme Court, and proposes that the Internal Revenue Service and the
Tax Court either clarify the meaning of "ordinary and necessary" by
disregarding the Supreme Court's dicta in Welch or develop a new
standard for use in applying section 162."3 This Note concludes that the
Internal Revenue Service has wrongly disallowed business deductions to
many "lower-level employees" by use of a double standard, and that this
situation should be remedied by use of a single standard that would apply
to employees, management, and employers. 4
I. THE HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 162
The "ordinary and necessary" standard for allowing business
deductions is not as simple as it appears. In order to determine whether
the taxpayer may deduct the expense, one must first answer the question
of whether a given activity is "ordinary and necessary" in relation to a
chairman of a corporation to take a deduction for expenses incurred in use of a private
airplane for business travel despite the corporation's policy of only reimbursing amounts
paid for commercial coach air travel).
' Itemized deductions such as this must equal at least two percent of the taxpayer's
adjusted (gross) income, and even then only the excess over that amount is deductible.
I.R.C. §§ 63, 67, 162 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10 290 U.S. 111, 113-15 (1933).
n See infra notes 15-56 and accompanying text
12 See infra notes 57-89 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 90-125 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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particular taxpayer's trade or business. The statute itself provides little
help on this issue, stating only that "there shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on a trade or business ... ,,15 The Regulations
that accompany section 162 offer some assistance. For instance, section
1.162-1(a) of the Treasury Regulations states that "business expenses ...
include the ordinary and necessary items directly connected with or
pertaining to the taxpayer's trade or business .... ." This section also
describes items customarily classified as business expenses:
Among the items included in business expenses are management
expenses, commissions .... labor, supplies, incidental repairs, operating
expenses of automobiles used in the trade or business, traveling
expenses while away from home solely in the pursuit of a trade or
business, ... advertising and other selling expenses, together with
insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft, accident, or other similar
losses in the case of a business, and rental for the use of business
property.
7
This list provides some guidance, but situations that the regulation does
not address often arise. In such cases, the taxpayer must turn to the courts
for interpretation.
The case of Welch v. Helvering offers an early Supreme Court
examination of the phrase "ordinary and necessary."' 8 In Welch, the
taxpayer, a former employee and part owner of a bankrupt company,
undertook to repay the company's debts when he obtained a job in a
similar capacity with another company. 9 The taxpayer claimed that the
expense of paying the bankrupt company's debts was a legitimate
business expense because he needed to protect his business reputation as
a grain broker!' The Welch Court ruled that while the taxpayer's
expenditures may have been "necessary," they were not "ordinary" and
therefore were not deductible under section 162.1
The Court in Welch addressed a number of issues in reaching this
result. One issue was whether an expense must be both "ordinary and
1 I.R.C. § 162(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1988).
17 Id.
" 290 U.S. 111, 113-15 (1933).
'9 Id. at 112.
" Id. at 112-13.
2'Id. at 116.
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necessary" in order to qualify under section 162.' The Welch Court did
not expressly rule on this issue. Instead, the Court implied that both
elements were needed since the Court denied the deduction on the basis
that it was not "ordinary" although the Court had previously stated that
the expense was "necessary."'rs It was not until the 1971 case of
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association4 that the Su-
preme Court expressly held that section 162 requires an expenditure to be
both ordinary and necessary.'
The next issue that the Welch Court faced was the proper interpreta-
tion of the terms "ordinary and necessary." Adopting the taxpayer's
construction, the Court defined "necessary" as "appropriate and help-
ful." 6 The Court seemed to have more trouble defining "ordinary,"
however. While the term "ordinary" signifies that which is customary in
a given trade or business,27 "ordinary ... is ... a variable affected by
time and place and circumstance." '2 This statement does little to clarify
the meaning of "ordinary," especially since the opinion arguably supports
three additional definitions of "ordinary." First, "ordinary" could be
defined as "noncapital '"3 in light of the Court's reasoning that the
taxpayer's reputation was a capital asset similar to goodwill and that
expenditures to create or protect it were capital in nature.3 Second, the
Court could have intended "ordinary" to mean "not bizarre"32 by stating
"that payment in such circumstances, instead of being ordinary is in a
high degree extraordinary."'3 Finally, the term "ordinary" could mean
"not personal' ' since the Court analogized the taxpayer's expenditure
to a personal expense such as restitution to restore a family's good name
" Id.
23 Id. at 115.
'A403 U.S. 345, 359 (1971) (denying a deduction for a premium paid to the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. by a state-chartered savings and loan association).
2' Id. at 352-53.
26 Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
27 Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) (defining the term "ordinary").
" Welch, 290 U.S. at 113-14.
= Joel S. Newman, On the Tax Meaning of "Ordinay'" How the lls of Welch
Could Be Cured Through Christian Science, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 231, 235 (1990) (discussing
the Supreme Court's failure to clearly define the term "ordinary" in Welch v. Helvering,
and the resulting confusion and conflicting rulings).
30 id
31 Welch, 290 U.S. at 115 ("Reputation and leaming are capital assets, like the good
will of an old partnership.").
32 Newman, supra note 29, at 235-36.
' Welch, 290 U.S. at 114.
34Newman, supra note 29, at 236.
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or a culture-enriching educational expense.35 While the Welch opinion
seemed to state that an "ordinary" expenditure would be usual and normal
in the course of business, the range of potential meanings for "ordinary"
and the lack of decisiveness by the Supreme Court left room for different
interpretations by later courts." The essential flaw in the Welch opinion
is Justice Cardozo's apparent unwillingness to clearly state the standard
for "ordinary" expenditures. Instead, the Court offered only dicta that
permitted later courts to create their own interpretations.
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify its definition of "ordinary"
with its decision in Deputy v. duPont 7 In duPont, a stockholder of a
corporation borrowed shares to give the executive committee a financial
interest in the corporation, agreeing to pay the lender an amount equal to
dividends on the stock plus any taxes the lender would accrue due to the
agreement." The Court, in disallowing the deduction because the
expense was not "ordinary," stated that "[o]rdinary has the connotation
of normal, usual or customary"39 and that "[o]ne of the extremely
relevant circumstances is the nature and scope of the particular business
out of which the expense in question accrued.'"0
Although du Pont seemed to settle the issue concerning the definition
of "ordinary," the Supreme Court offered an entirely different definition
twenty years later in the case of Commissioner v. Tellier. ' The taxpayer
in Tellier, a securities trader, had incurred extensive legal fees in an
unsuccessful defense against a criminal prosecution and attempted to
deduct these expenditures as a business expense.42 Allowing the deduc-
tion, the Court stated that the principal function of the term "ordinary"
was to clarify the distinction between expenses and capital expendi-
tures43 and found that the taxpayer's expenses were not capital in
nature." The different standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in du
Pont and Tellier have allowed lower courts, particularly the Tax Court,
to create multiple interpretations of the single standard of "ordinary'"5
31 Welch, 290 U.S. at 115.
31 See infra notes 57-89 and accompanying text.
37 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
38 Id. at 490-92.
39 Id. at 495.
40 Id. at 496.
4' 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
42 Id. at 688.
41 Id. at 689-90.
4Id. at 690.
45 See, e.g., Trebilcock v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 852, 853 (1975) (acq.), aft'd, 557
F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1977) (deduction partially denied for minister's advising of taxpayer
1993-941
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and have left these courts confused regarding the true standard for
"ordinary."
Although the interpretation of the term "necessary" does not seem as
problematic as that of "ordinary," there is room for dissension, particular-
ly by the lower courts. For example, the Tax Court in Henry v. Commis-
sioner46 required the taxpayer to establish that the expense was actually
"necessary," in the more common sense of the word, rather than merely
appropriate and helpful.47 In United States v. Tauferner,8 the court
stated that the term .'necessity'... has gradations from the absolute out
in all directions to 'advisable,' to 'preferred,' or to 'convenient'....
The possible meanings for the term "necessary" are so numerous that
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has failed to apply the same standard
in factually similar cases. In Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v.
Commissioner,"0 the Sixth Circuit permitted the taxpayer to deduct the
expense of a bribe that the taxpayer had paid in order to retain a
subcontract."1 Although the primary focus of the court's opinion was
determining whether the expense was "ordinary" since the payment of
kickbacks was allowed in that state, the court also found the expense to
be "a cost of doing business like any other-an indispensable one
here.... 2 By permitting this deduction, the court impliedly construed
the expense to be "necessary." Less than a year later, the Sixth Circuit in
Car-Ron Asphalt Paving Co. v. Commissioner53 held that a kickback paid
to receive a subcontract was not "necessary."' In Car-Ron Asphalt, the
court recognized that the Supreme Court had established an "appropriate
and helpful" interpretation of "necessary," but considered it to be only a
concerning business problems because the expense was not an "ordinary" expense of the
business); Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879, 885-86 (1961) (tax attorney could not
deduct the expense of maintaining a yacht which had a pennant with "1040" on it, even
though the pennant promoted inquiry and developed clientele, because the expense was
deemed too personal in nature and therefore not "ordinary").
436 T.C. 879 (1961).
47 Id. at 884.
4 407 F.2d 243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 824 (1969).
4-9 Id. at 246.
'o 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 1121.
'2 Id. at 1125.
"' 758 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1985). This case is remarkably similar to the Raymond
Bertolini Trucking case, especially since the same corporation, Forest City Enterprises,
demanded the kickbacks in both cases. Car-Ron Asphalt Paving Co., 758 F.2d at 1132;
Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co., 736 F.2d at 1121.
4 Car-Ron Asphalt Paving Co., 758 F.2d at 1134.
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"minimal requirement." 5 Indeed, the court used a stricter standard when
it affirmed the Tax Court's ruling that the expenses were not "necessary"
because they were not essential.56 Although the "essential" standard and
the "appropriate and helpful" standard may simply be different points
along a continuum of definitions for the term "necessary," the above two
cases demonstrate that the application of a given definition can change
the outcome of a case.
While some lower courts' rulings indicate disagreement concerning
how strict the "necessary" standard should be (as opposed to a disagree-
ment concerning the actual meaning of the term, as found in the dispute
over the interpretation of "ordinary"), these differences still result in
uncertainty for the courts and a lack of predictability for the taxpayer.
The next section of this Note demonstrates how the lack of standard
definitions for the terms "ordinary and necessary" has allowed recent
courts to develop conflicting standards for taxpayers, depending on the
taxpayer's position on the employment continuum.
II. CASES DEMONSTRATING THE DOUBLE STANDARD
The lack of a single interpretation for the phrase "ordinary and
necessary" has created confusion for both the taxpayer and the courts.
Initially, the problem arose from inconsistent rulings on whether
expenditures at issue were "ordinary and necessary." One of the most
salient examples of this is the ruling in Trebilcock v. Commissioner, in
which the Tax Court partially denied a company's deduction for
compensation that the company had paid to a minister who was kept on
retainer to counsel employees on business as well as personal matters.57
Despite the ruling in Trebilcock, R.J. Reynolds has stated that the
company has routinely deducted the expense of keeping both a chaplain
on the payroll and a chapel in the company offices." While such
inconsistencies still occur, the most troublesome trend has been the
differing applications of the "ordinary and necessary" standard to the
s Id. at 1133-34.
"Id. at 1134.
Trebilcock v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 852, 853 (1975) (acq.), aft'd, 557 F.2d 1226
(6th Cir. 1977).
58 Newman, supra note 29, at 257 & n.243 (citing an interview with an R.J. Reynolds
audit staff person conducted on January 10, 1989). For a general discussion of the role
of clergy in the corporate world, see Paul Bemish, Company Chaplain Becomes a Fixture
in the World of Mammon; More Concerns Hire Ministers for Prayer and Counseling;
Some Clergymen Are Critical, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1969, at Al.
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business expenses of taxpayers, often based on the taxpayer's level on the
"employment continuum."
Cases involving teacher expenses offer the clearest examples of the
"double standard." One such example is Wheatland v. Commissioner.
5 9
In Wheatland, a sixth-grade teacher purchased electronic equipment and
three sets of encyclopedias for use in his classroom." The court
disallowed the deduction because the expenditures were not "necessary"
to the taxpayer's trade of being a teacher since the materials were not
required for teaching the curriculum of his sixth grade science class."
The Tax Court also found that the taxpayer's expenses were not "ordi-
nary," stating that schoolteachers do not ordinarily purchase "equipment
for [their] classroom[s] out of [their] own funds."'  A somewhat
different situation arose in Patterson v. Commissioner,63 where a teacher
who set up a special classroom to enhance the educational and cultural
exposure of deprived children in the area was denied a business expense
deduction.' The court found that although the taxpayer's intentions were
admirable, the expenditures incurred were neither ordinary nor necessary
because they were not "directly or proximately related to the carrying on
of his profession as a schoolteacher." 5
Similarly, in the recent case of Mann v. Commissioner,"6 the cost of
items that a teacher purchased to supplement and augment classroom
learning were held to be non-deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses.67 The court stated that these expenditures did not
benefit the teacher's career and that such "expenditures generally are
deductible only if related to the continuation (or advancement) of an
employee's employment."' The same result is found even within the
ranks of higher education. In Mathes v. Commissioner,69 the Tax Court
denied a college professor's deduction for the cost of books because the
books were available in the university library and, therefore, were not
"necessary" expenses.7"
59 23 T.C.M. (CCI-) 579 (1964).
6 Id. at 580.
"Id. at 582.
"Id.
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1003 (1971).
'4Id. at 1008.
'Id. at 1007.
65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598 (1993).
6Id.
"Id. at 2602.
60 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1990).
70 Id at 704.
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In each of the above cases, neither the school nor the school system
reimbursed the taxpayer for the purchase of the classroom materials. If,
however, the schools had elected to reimburse the taxpayers or had
incurred the expenses in their own right, such expenditures would have
been considered a working condition fringe benefit under section 132."'
The cost of working condition fringe benefits is both excludible from the
employee's income and deductible to the employer.' Although the
school does not pay taxes and therefore could not use the deduction, the
fact that the deduction would be available to the school as an employer
and not to the teacher as an employee demonstrates the conflicting
standards applied by the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court.
These "teacher cases" represent only one of a number of situations in
which the courts apply differing standards for employers, management,
and employees under section 162. The "double standard" applied to
employers and employees is also found in the corporate setting. In
Dunkelberger v. Commissioner,73 the taxpayer, a lower-level supervisor,
deducted the costs of periodic lunches that she provided for those she
supervised as rewards for good work a Christmas party, candy and
doughnuts purchased to boost morale in the "stressful work environment,"
and flowers sent to a sick employee.74 The court held that these
unreimbursed expenditures could not be deducted as employee business
expenses, because they were not a condition of the taxpayer's employment
and, therefore, were not "ordinary and necessary."75 The court implied,
however, that the company could have deducted the expenses if it had
reimbursed the taxpayer.76 In order to take the deduction under section
132, the company would have been required to classify the expenditures
as working condition fringe benefits or de minimis fringe benefits. One
of the conditions for a working condition fringe benefit is that the
expenses be such that the employee would have been able to deduct the
expenses under section 162 if the employee had made the purchases
himself.' Since the taxpayer in Dunkelberger made the purchases with
- I.R.C. § 132 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Cf. Federal Tax Handbook (RIA) 1248
(1994) (citing employer-paid subscriptions to business periodicals as an example of a
working condition fringe benefit).
I.R.C. § 132 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
- 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1567 (1992).
74 Id. at 1568.
71 Id. at 1568-69.
76Id. at 1569.
77 I.R.C. § 132 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). A de minimus benefit is also one that may
be deducted by the company, although the definition of the term de minimus implies that
such expenses might not be deductible to the employee who incurred the expenses but for
1993-94]
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her own money, yet was not allowed to take a section 162 deduction, it
would be illogical to permit the company to deduct the same expenses
simply because the company made the expenditures rather than the
employee. Dunkelberger, therefore, clearly exemplifies the "double
standard" being applied to employers and employees.
The cases of Associated Obstetricians and Gynecologists, P.C. v.
Commissioner" and Henderson v. Commissione7 also illustrate the
double standard. In Associated Obstetricians, a corporation attempted to
deduct the cost of decorating its new offices."0 The Tax Court allowed
the taxpayer to deduct the depreciation of interior decorating services and
office furnishings and implied that the taxpayer could have deducted the
depreciation of works of art placed in its offices if the taxpayer had
determined the useful life of the art." In contrast, the Tax Court in
Henderson denied a government attorney's deduction for the costs of a
framed print and a live plant purchased for her office.'
A number of authorities have analyzed the problems that taxpayers
encounter in attempting to deduct office furnishings. These authorities
have found that executives and self-employed persons are often able to
deduct the costs of office furnishings even if there are personal benefits
to the taxpayer, because the expenditures are viewed as promoting
morale. 3 As one authority noted, "even the most puritanical definition
of business expense is not likely to prevent self-employed taxpayers from
deducting the cost of air-conditioning their offices, upholstering their
swivel chairs, or adding gadgets to their telephones, even if they derive
personal pleasure from these amenities."'
The case of Noyce v. Commissioner 85 is yet another example of the
conflicting standards courts impose on employers and employees. In
Noyce, the taxpayer, a vice-chairman of a corporation, deducted part of
the expense of maintaining a private airplane that he used partly for
business travel. 6 The taxpayer's practice of using a private airplane
conflicted with the corporation's policy of reimbursing employees for
the fact that they were incurred in the course of business.
7 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 613 (1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1985).
46 T.C.M. (CCII) 566 (1983).
'3 Associated Obstetricians, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 617.
81 Id. at 616-17.
82 Henderson, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 566.
3 See Newman, supra note 29, at 256; Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions,
Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193, 203-04 (1973).
"3 Bittker, supra note 83, at 204.
85 97 T.C. 670 (1991).
" Id. at 671.
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commercial coach rates only, regardless of whether an employee could
perform his duties more efficiently by using first class travel or a private
planeY Nonetheless, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer's deduction,
finding that the airplane was a "necessary" expense because it was
"'appropriate and helpful' to the execution of petitioner's duties."' The
court also found that the expenses were "ordinary" because they were
customary under the circumstances, considering the taxpayer's extensive
travel and busy schedule.' Had the same standards for "ordinary and
necessary" been applied in Dunkelberger, it is likely that the taxpayer in
Dunkelberger would have been allowed the deduction.
I.T O THE ERR R o THE DOUBLE STANDARD
The cases described in the previous section indicate that taxpayers on
the higher end of the employment continuum are often allowed section
162 deductions for certain expenses, while those at the lower end are
denied deductions for the same or similar expenditures. If the Tax Court
had employed the "customary within a trade or business" definition of
"ordinary" and the "appropriate and helpful" interpretation of "neces-
sary" in deciding the cases involving "low lever' employees, the Tax
Court would have allowed the deductions. An application of the Welch9'
definitions to these cases illustrates the logical flaw committed by the Tax
Court.
For instance, in each of the cases involving the purchase of classroom
items by teachers, the expenditures were held to be neither ordinary nor
necessary.' If the court had applied the "customary in the particular
trade or business" interpretation of "ordinary,"93 however, the items
would be deemed ordinary business expenses. Teachers customarily
purchase items for their classrooms, particularly in smaller school districts
with limited funds available for distribution among the schools.' In fact,
the teachers of Sand Gap Elementary School in Jackson County,
" Id. at 677-78.
"Id. at 686.
,Id. at 687.
"See supra notes 3-4, 26-27 and accompanying text.
91 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text (Mann v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2598, 2598 (1993); Mathes v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 704, 704 (1990);
Wheatland v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 579, 580 (1964)).
"See supra notes 3, 27 and accompanying text.
14 Telephone Interview with Joyce A. McCowan, Teacher at Sand Gap Elementary
School, Sand Gap, Kentucky (October 23, 1993).
1993-94]
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Kentucky, average spending from $500 to $700 per year of their own money
on supplies for their classrooms, such as bulletin board materials, construction
paper, school supplies and similar items.95 Since such expenditures seem to
be a common practice of the profession, they should be classified as ordinary
under the "customary to the trade or business" definition. Likewise, the
expenditures of the teachers in the noted cases would be considered
"ordinary" under this standard. The taxpayers in Mann and Mathes had also
purchased supplies,9 6 which would certainly be a common expenditure,
assuming that the example described above is representative of schools across
the country. While the taxpayers' expenditures in Wheatland97 and
Patterson" for encyclopedias and electrical equipment were not expenses that
occur with great frequency in schools, the definition of ordinary does not
require that the taxpayer incur the expenditure often, or even in every similar
business. Rather, it must only be an expense that could reasonably be
expected.99 Thus, under the Welch standard, the teachers' expenses are
"ordinary."
The expenditures incurred by the teachers are also "necessary" based on
the "appropriate and helpful" definition in Welch.' The expenditures made
by the teachers in the cases at issue consisted of books, supplies and
educational equipment."' All of the items are "appropriate and helpful" in
promoting learning, which is the purpose of a teacher's job. These expenses
could also be classified as necessary in the customary sense of the word. In
many poorer school districts, classroom materials are often unavailable unless
the teacher purchases them." For instance, the teachers at Sand Gap
Elementary School have no choice but to use their own money if they want
to purchase items for their classrooms, because in 1992 each teacher only
received $100 from the school board with which to purchase classroom
supplies."3 Despite the obvious necessity of such teachers' expenditures,
under the case law the teachers cannot deduct these expenditures as business
expenses.'" The teachers' expenditures in the examples mentioned above
were made in lieu of expenses generally incurred by the schools themselves
and are business expenses in that they were incurred in the furtherance of the
9 Id.
Manm, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2602; Mathes, 60 T.C.M. (CCII) at 709.
Wheatland v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M (CCH) 579, 580 (1964).
Patterson v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1003, 1007 (1971).
9Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
10 Id. at 113.
"o See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
'"Telephone Interview with Joyce A. McCowan, supra note 94.
103 Id.
104 See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
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schools' as well as the teachers' trade or business. Since the expenditures are
business expenses and could easily be classified as "ordinary and necessary"
if the courts applied the original interpretation of Welch, the expenses should
be deductible under section 162.105
In addition to the effect on the ability of teachers to deduct business
expenses, application of the Welch definition of "ordinary and necessary" to
expenses incurred in a business setting may also render these business
expenses deductible. The Dunkelberger case provides an excellent example.
In Dunkelberger, the Tax Court ruled that for an employee's business
expenses to be "ordinary and necessary," the employee must show that the
expenses were a condition of employment,1"6 even though the business
could have deducted the expense had it reimbursed the employee.0 7 This
requirement demonstrates the extent of the discrepancy between employer and
employee deductions. Instead of applying the "appropriate and helpful" and
"customary in the trade or business" standards, the court applied the "it keeps
you from losing yourjob" standard. Surely this is not what Congress intended
with section 162b "ordinary and necessary" language, especially since such
a stringent standard is not uniformly applied to employers.1
8
The expenses incurred by the taxpayer in Dunkelberger were both
"ordinary" and "necessary" under the Welch standard. Occasional lunches,
Christmas parties, doughnuts, and candy and flowers for sick employees are
all expenses frequently incurred in business and, therefore, should be
considered "ordinary." If the business had made these expenditures, it would
have at least been able to classify the expenditures as de minimis fringe
benefits provided to employees under section 132.09 The Regulations to
section 132 state that examples of de minimis fringe benefits include:
occasional cocktail parties, group meals, or picnics for employees and their
guests; traditional birthday or holiday gifts of property (not cash) with a low
fair market value; occasional theater or sporting event tickets; coffee,
.0. An argument may be made that expenditures for school supplies and learning
materials should be classified as charitable contributions and deducted in that manner.
While this argument has some merit since section 170 includes contributions to school
systems within its list of allowable charities, I.R.C. § 170 (Supp. IV 1992), there are also
many problems with the argument, such as difficulties a teacher will encounter when
classifying a particular class as a charity. See, e.g., Patterson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M.
(CCH) 640, 643 (1968), rev'don other grounds, 136 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1971). For this
reason, this debate is beyond the scope of this Note.
106 Dunkelberger v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1567, 1569 (1992).
107 Id.
10 See supra notes 73-77, 85-89 and accompanying text.
0 I.R.C. § 132(a) and (e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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doughnuts, and soft drinks; local telephone calls; and flowers, fruit,
books, or similar property provided to employees under special
circumstances (e.g. on account of illness, outstanding performance, or
family crisis).
10
Since the expenditures made by the taxpayer in Dunkelberger are among
those listed in the Treasury Regulations, the authors of the Regulation
must have found these expenses to be common in business. Accordingly,
such expenses are "ordinary."
The taxpayer's expenses in Dunkelberger are also "necessary" in that
they were "appropriate and helpfil" in carrying out the taxpayer's job.
The taxpayer was a supervisor to employees who were often under a lot
of stress due to the nature of their work' The taxpayer made the
expenditures to help boost morale"' and possibly increase the produc-
tivity of the employees under her, thereby helping the taxpayer in the
performance of her job. Had the Tax Court applied the "appropriate and
helpful" defmition of "necessary" to this case, the taxpayer would have
had a section 162 deduction for these expenses.
Application of the actual standard that the Dunkelberger court used
to a few hypotheticals demonstrates the problems inherent in that court's
definition. For example, if a court applied the Dunkelberger standard to
all cases, an attorney employed by a law firm could not deduct the cost
of American Bar Association dues because it is a voluntary association.
Although American Bar Association dues are "appropriate and helpful"
to an associate in a law firm, dues paid to a voluntary association are not
"necessary" under the Dunkelberger standard because they are not a
condition of the associate's employment."' However, if a partner in that
firm paid these dues as a self-employed person, the partner would
probably be able to deduct the expenditure as a "necessary" expense." 4
Similarly, if the firm paid the dues for the associate, the firm could
deduct the expense by classifying it as a section 132 working condition
fringe benefit.
Another example of the problem with the Dunkelberger court's
interpretation of "necessary" lies with the medical profession. Suppose a
physician employed at the Veterans' Administration Hospital incurs
expenses for continuing medical education, only part of which the
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (1993).
.. Dunkelberger, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1568.
112 Id.
. But cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6 (1960).
114 See Noyce v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 670, 686 (1991).
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American Medical Association requires. Although the non-mandatory
portion of the education is clearly "appropriate and helpful," the expense
would not be classified as "necessary" under the Dunkelberger stan-
dard.'15 Because the education was not a requirement of the physician's
continued employment, the expense would be non-deductible. The
Dunkelberger court's failure to use the Welch v. Helvering interpretation
of "ordinary and necessary" would clearly affect the deductibility of these
common expenditures.
Use of the Welch Court's definition of "ordinary and necessary"
would also have affected the result in Henderson v. Commissioner.",
The taxpayer's expenditures for a live plant and a framed print" 7 should
have been deductible in light of the ruling in Associated Obstetricians,
which allowed a depreciation deduction for the expense of decorating the
corporation's office."' While the Henderson case may not be as clear-
cut as some of the other cases, it seems that the taxpayer's expenditures
were "ordinary" in the sense that people in the business world often
purchase items with which to decorate their offices." 9 Since the taxpay-
er's expenses in Henderson presumably enhance morale, they are also
"necessary" in that the expenses would be "appropriate and helpful,"'
20
or at least as "appropriate and helpful" as the office decor in Associated
Obstetricians.
Use of different standards than "customary in trade or business" and
"appropriate and helpful" for determining the deductibility of office
furnishings could lead to a number of problems. For example, suppose a
pediatrician purchases toys, children's books and magazines, and child-
size furniture for the waiting room of his office. These expenditures,
although found in many pediatricians' offices, are not directly related to
the pediatrician's practice since they are not a prerequisite to the
providing of medical treatment to children. Therefore, if the "necessary"
standard utilized by the courts is the "traditional" definition of that which
keeps you from losing your job, these expenditures for pediatricians'
offices would not be deductible. If such a result appears to be beyond the
intended scope of section 162, then perhaps, based on the intended scope
of section 162, the taxpayers in Associated Obstetricians should have
11. But ef. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1967).
" 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 566 (1983).
117 Id. at 567.
1.. Associated Obstetricians and Gynecologists, P.C. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M.
(CCII) 613, 616-17 (1983), affd, 762 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1985).
"9 See Newman, supra note 29, at 256-57 & n.242.
'20 See id. at 256.
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been denied a deduction. Once again, the use of a single, clear standard
by the courts would have prevented a great deal of confusion.
Noyce exemplifies the different standards that are applied to upper-
level management. In Noyce, a former chief executive officer and current
vice-chairman of the corporation's board of directors was allowed a
deduction for a portion of the purchase and upkeep of a private air-
plane.' Since the taxpayer's purchase of a private airplane appeared to
be a capital expense (particularly since the taxpayer attempted to deduct
depreciation), the court in Noyce apparently used the "customary in trade
or business" definition of "ordinary" rather than the "noncapital"
definition. The taxpayer's purchase also appeared to be a personal expense
because the company reimbursed employees for commercial flights. 2
Applying the traditional Welch standard to the taxpayer's expenditures,
which were quite extensive, the Noyce court found the taxpayer's expense
to be necessary because "the airplane was 'appropriate and helpful' to the
execution of [taxpayer's] duties."'" Noyce, therefore, is a clear example
of the fact that a different set of standards is used for business expenses
of corporate management.
In many of the cases above, the courts held lower level employees'
expenditures to be non-deductible in spite of the fact that these expenses
appear to be "ordinary and necessary" under any definition. In contrast,
other cases previously mentioned support the ability of employers and
management to deduct remarkably similar expenses. The primary cause
of this discrepancy is the courts' use of different definitions for the phrase
"ordinary and necessary" depending on the type of taxpayer at issue. The
Supreme Court could alleviate much of this confusion if it simply
reaffirmed and clarified its original interpretation of "ordinary and
necessary." Since this will not occur until the Supreme Court grants
certiorari to another "ordinary and necessary" case, however, the Internal
Revenue Service or Congress should take the initiative to establish a
single, clear meaning for the phrase "ordinary and necessary." The Welch
Court's interpretation offers the best approach because most courts are
familiar with it. Adoption of the Welch approach would also avoid both
the capital/noncapital issue that section 263(a) 4 covers as well as the
issue of whether an expenditure is "too personal," which section 262'
121 Noyce v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 670, 686 (1991).
122 Id. at 677.
'2 Id. at 686.
124 I.R.C. § 263(a) (1988) (denying deductions for expenditures made in the
acquisition, protection or improvement of property).
12 I.R.C. § 262 (1988) (prohibiting the deduction of personal expenses).
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addresses. Nevertheless, the adoption of any standard that is not open to
the multitude of interpretations possible under the current standard would
have the advantages of lessening the discrepancy between taxpayers and
making the deduction of business expenses under section 162 more
predictable.
CONCLUSION
Over the years, courts have developed multiple definitions for a single
phrase in the Internal Revenue Code-"ordinary and necessary"-as a
result of the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's decision in Welch v.
Helvering. Although the Welch Court intended "ordinary" to mean
"customary in trade or business,"'26 lower courts and even the Supreme
Court have interpreted "ordinary" to mean "noncapital," "not personal,"
and "not bizarre."'' 7 Likewise, "necessary" has often been defined in
the "traditional" sense of the word, that is, "it keeps you from losing your
job," even though the Court in Welch ruled that "necessary" should mean
"appropriate and helpful."'28 The lack of a single definition of "ordinary
and necessary" has created confusion and discrepancy among taxpayers
and courts.
Numerous cases provide evidence of the growing trend toward
different interpretations of "ordinary and necessary."' 29 The courts in
these cases generally applied their own interpretations of the terms
"ordinary" and "necessary" to employees and low-level management,
while applying the traditional Welch standard to employers, self-employed
persons and upper management. This practice has resulted in a "double
standard" that continues to cause uncertainty for the employee taxpayer
who is often denied a deduction of a given expenditure as a business
expense under section 162, while his employer takes the deduction with
little or no trouble.
In many, if not all, of the cases in which a court denied the taxpayer
a deduction on the basis that the expenditure was not ordinary and
necessary, the use of the "customary in trade or business" and "appropri-
ate and helpful" standards for "ordinary and necessary" would have
changed the result. These definitions should be applied to taxpayers on
both ends of the employment continuum, thereby resolving a great deal
of confusion by courts and taxpayers. If, however, it is not feasible to use
' See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
17 Newman, supra note 29, at 235-36.
28 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-89 and accompanying text.
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the Welch definitions, the courts or Congress should establish a clear
standard that applies equally to employers, self-employed persons,
management, and employees.
The trend toward a "double standard" for business deductions under
section 162 has deprived many taxpayers of what should have been
legitimate deductions. The standard being applied to taxpayers at the
lower end of the employment continuum is different from that being
applied to those at the higher end, even though the decision to permit or
deny the deductions is based on the same provision of the Internal
Revenue Code. Principles of fairness and equity require that the situation
be remedied by use of a single, clear definition of the phrase "ordinary
and necessary."
Cheryl A. Cunagin
